Information and Incentive

Numbering Code G-ECON31 6A514 LE43 Year/Term 2022 ・ Second semester
Number of Credits 2 Course Type Lecture
Target Year Target Student
Language English Day/Period Tue.2
Instructor name Chen Chia-hui (Institute of Economic Research Associate Professor)
Outline and Purpose of the Course The course will focus on several topis of dynamic games with incomplete information. We will review literature on experimentation and strategic information transmission in dynamic environments. In addition to conventional lectures delivered by the lecturer, students are required to present a paper related to one of the course topics in English.
Course Goals The goal of this course is to become familiar with research advances and techniques in several important research topics in dynamic games with incomplete information and to help students develop research ideas.
Schedule and Contents 1. Learning, Experimentation (Weeks 1 to 8)

Bergemann D, and Hege U, (2005), The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping, RAND Journal of Economics, 36, 719-752.
Bonatti A, and Rantakari H, (2016), The Politics of Compromise, American Economic Review, 106, 229--259.
Che Y-K, and Horner J, (2018), Recommender Systems as Mechanisms for Social Learning, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 133(2), 871-925.
Callander S, and Harstad B, (2015), Experimentation in Federal Systems, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 130(2), 951-1002.
Callander S, and Hummel P, (2014), Preemptive Policy Experimentation, Econometrica, 82(4), 1509-1528.
Guo Y, (2016), Dynamic Delegation of Experimentation, American Economic Review, 106, 1969-2008.
Halac M, Kartik N, and Liu Q, (2016), Optimal Contracts for Experimentation, Review of Economic Studies, 83, 1040--1091.
Horner J, and Samuelson L, (2013), Incentives for Experimenting Agents, RAND Journal of Economics, 44, 632-663.
Horner J, and Skrzypacz A, (2017), Learning, Experimentation, and Information Design, Advances in Economics and Econometrics--Eleventh World Congress, 1, 63-98.
Keller G, Rady S, and Cripps M, (2005), Strategic Experimentation with Exponential Bandits, Econometrica, 73, 39-68.
Klein N.A, and Rady S, (2011), Negatively Correlated Bandits, Review of Economic Studies, 78, 693-732.
Kremer I, Mansour Y, and Perry M, (2014), Implementing the "Wisdom of the Crowd", Journal of Political Economy, 122(5), 988-1012.
Murto P, and Valimaki J, (2011), Learning and Information Aggregation in an Exit Game, Review of Economic Studies, 78, 1426--1461.
Strulovici B, (2010), Learning While Voting: Determinants of Collective Experimentation, Econometrica, 78, 933-971.
Wolitzky A, (2018), Learning from Others' Outcomes, American Economic Review, 108(10), 2763-2801.

2. Dynamic Strategic Information Transmission and Information Design (Weeks 9 to 15)

Acharya V, DeMarzo P, and Kremer I, (2011), Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of Announcements, American Economic Review, 101, 2955-2979.
Bergemann D, and Morris S, (2019), Information design: a unified perspective, Journal of Economic Literature, 57, 1--57.
Ely J, (2017), Beeps, American Economic Review, 107(1), 31-53.
Ely J, Frankel A, and Kamenica E, (2015), Suspense and Surprise, Journal of Political Economy, 123(1), 215-260.
Guttman I, Kremer I, and Skrzypacz A, (2014), Not Only What but also When - A Theory of Dynamic Voluntary Disclosure, American Economic Review, 104(8), 2400-2420.
Kamenica E, and Gentzkow M, (2011), Bayesian Persuasion, American Economic Review, 101, 2590--2615.
Horner J, and Skrzypacz A, (2016), Selling Information, Journal of Political Economy, 124(6), 1515-1562.
Kamenica E, (2019), Bayesian Persuasion and Information Design, Annual Review of Economics, 11, 249--272.
Evaluation Methods and Policy Grading will be based on the presentation (70%) and active participation in discussion of presentations (30%).
Course Requirements Prior knowledge of game theory is required.
Study outside of Class (preparation and review) Students are required to present a paper related to one of the course topics in English and participate in discussions actively.
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